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When All Else Fails:
Regulating Risky Products through Tort Litigation
Wendy Wagner*
Agency regulation has not only become the preferred approach to protecting 
public health from risky products and activities, but a number of prominent scholars 
argue that it should be the only game in town.  Derogatorily referred to as “regulation by 
litigation,”1 mass litigation against tobacco, breast implant, gun, and a number of drug 
and other product manufacturers is often considered an illegitimate end-run around the 
political process rather than an a supplemental institutional mechanism for making 
products safer.  Leading lights like Richard Epstein, Kip Viscusi, Richard Reich, and 
Peter Schuck2 argue that, unlike agencies, the courts deciding this regulatory litigation 
lack technical competence, are equipped with only a limited tool kit of regulatory-like 
remedies, and, most importantly, lack the democratic legitimacy to resolve inherently 
political issues about the level and appropriateness of government intervention relating to 
product safety.3  Rather than advancing product safety, they argue that the primarily or 
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  The types of mass litigation discussed here are listed as examples of “regulatory 
litigation” in a book on “Regulation through Litigation” edited by Kip Viscusi (2002).  
2
 Prof. Schuck is more equivocal than some of the other critics and concedes some of the 
benefits of this litigation.  Nevertheless, he tends to understate the role of the litigation in 
lowering a variety of inflated information costs and the comparative deficiencies of the 
regulatory process relative to the court in addressing these information costs.
3 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Implications for Legal Reform, in REGULATION THROUGH 
LITIGATION 325 (W. Kip Viscusi ed. 2002); Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology 
of Tort Law, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 4-17 (Walter Olson ed. 1988); Peter 
H. Schuck, Benched: The pros and cons of having judges make the law, WASHINGTON 
2perhaps exclusive benefit of this tort litigation is to line the pockets of entrepreneurial 
plaintiff attorneys.  
In this article I argue that these criticisms, as well as the larger body of respected 
scholarship on public health regulation upon which they are based, suffer from a critical 
flaw – they ignore debilitating limitations in information that reduce the competence and 
accountability of agency regulators.4  In contrast to these wishful accounts of the 
regulatory process, protective regulation is in reality plagued by a variety of important 
information costs that slow and even halt regulatory progress.  By neglecting the limits in 
the availability and accessibility of policy- relevant information, analysts assume away 
important realities about the regulatory state that are critical to their institutional analysis.  
Economists have learned – thanks to the path-breaking work of Nobel laureates
Joseph Stiglitz, George Ackerlof, and Michael Spence – that ignoring imperfections and 
uncertainties in information can lead to ivory tower analyses that diverge in significant 
ways from reality.5 As a result of the work of Stiglitz, Ackerlof, and Pence, “much of 
what economists believed--what they thought to be true on the basis of research and 
MONTHLY, December 2000, at 35, 39; see generally Note, Edward T. Schroeder, A Tort 
by Any Other Name? In Search of the Distinction Between Regulation Through Litigation 
and Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 897, 897-98 (2005) (summarizing the 
positions of these critics).
4
 When regulatory decisions are made based primarily on the politics of the Executive 
Branch, the tort system also offers an important mechanism for outsiders to advance their 
preferred regulatory ends.  See, e.g., Editorial, New Strategy on Clean Air, New York 
Times, March 4, 2006, at A26 (describing a nuisance suit by the North Carolina Attorney 
General seeking injunctive relief against power plants in neighboring states filed as a 
“’last resort’ arising from the administration’s weakening of longstanding regulatory 
tools that had been used to make individual plants clean up their emissions.”)  This 
complementary justification for the tort system – to circumvent Executive Branch 
priorities -- is not considered in this article, however.  Most of the “regulation by 
litigation” of concern does not address regulatory inadequacies that are the result of 
deliberate political decisions.
5 See http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/index.html.
3analysis over almost a century—turned out not to be robust to considerations of even 
slight imperfections [or asymmetries] of information.”6  Legal academics lag quite far 
behind economists in appreciating how impediments to accessing information can impair 
the functioning of legal institutions.  Legal scholars, for example, rarely acknowledge the 
problems created by asymmetric information or other limitations in available information
in promulgating health and environmental regulations, despite the fact that these 
information barriers complicate standard setting and licensing and obstruct enforcement.7
In some settings, then, the tort system can be more effective than the regulatory 
system in accessing the various types of information needed to inform regulatory 
decisions.   In consumer and health protection, for example, the tort system provides both 
more tools and more rewards to enterprising plaintiffs to uncover asymmetric information 
held by regulated parties regarding their products’ risks than the regulatory system. In 
addition, because the tort system generally involves a less complex process and demands 
that attorneys provide adequate representation of their clients, the general public can 
generally gain easier access to information relevant to evaluating the costs and benefits of 
regulating a risky product as compared with the regulatory process.   
6
 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth 
Century Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON., 1441, 1461 (2000).
7
 Seminal thinkers such as Professors Bruce Ackerman at Yale, Richard Stewart at NYU, 
and Cass Sunstein at Chicago/Harvard are representative of a top echelon of scholars who 
insist, often passionately, on the need to implement elaborately information-dependent 
reforms without considering that this same information might lie in the superior control 
of regulated parties.  See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN 
COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 328–30 (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, 
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–40 (1985); Richard B. 
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 151–
54 (2001); Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627–42.
4Once the information needed to inform regulation is made available through tort 
litigation, however, the work of the tort system is done.  Regulators must then re-enter the 
process and develop more sophisticated and streamlined approaches to product regulation 
after the barriers to information have been lowered.  In this way, the tort and regulatory 
system operate in a complementary, rather than mutually exclusive, fashion.  
This discussion of the indispensable role of tort litigation in lowering information-
related barriers to regulating risky products unfolds in three sections.  Part I identifies 
three factors (or information costs) that impede participation by the public and their 
representatives in health and environmental regulation and highlights the comparative 
attributes of the courts, relative to the political process, in lowering the costs of accessing 
this information.  Part II then reviews two of the most controversial mass lawsuits 
assailed by “regulation through litigation” critics and notices that even in these cases 
courts manage to lower inflated information costs and improve the availability of 
regulation-relevant information in valuable ways.  Part III concludes by offering several, 
more general lessons for comparing the institutional performance of the tort and 
regulatory systems, at least in the arena of public health protection.
I.  INFORMATION COSTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONING
Contemporary analysts generally take for granted the “fact” that regulatory 
agencies enjoy far greater access to information regarding product and health risks than
the legislative or judicial systems.  These analysts assume that since regulators have 
complicated and extensive legislative grants of authority, they can legally and politically 
acquire any information they desire.
5In the real world of contemporary health regulation, the availability of needed 
information is limited and can pose insurmountable barriers to participation.  Under most 
environmental and health statutes, regulators have – at best – only limited authority in 
acquiring basic information about product and activity risks.8 The public and their 
official or unofficial representatives face still higher costs in understanding and 
navigating the regulatory process and often cannot obtain the information made available 
to regulators without incurring high costs.  As a consequence, instead of a system bulging 
with important health information and characterized by strong public interest 
representation, quite the opposite situation can exist in the regulatory state: Regulated 
parties enjoy asymmetries in information relevant to regulation that are not disclosed and 
can remain tightly held (asymmetrical information); the general public faces high and 
sometimes insurmountable costs in acquiring this information as well as in participating 
in the regulatory process itself (process costs); and there is little information available to 
the diffuse public with regard to how well they are being represented by their nonprofit-
agents (agency costs).  
While tort litigation is hardly the perfect mechanism for addressing these 
problems, the tort process does overcome some of the most severe information-related 
barriers that prevent interested parties from participating in regulatory decisions and, at 
the same time, creates significant incentives for representatives of the diffuse public –
real victims who claim damages – to participate in decisions involving the regulation of 
8
 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental 
Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L. J.
1619, 1670-77 (2004) (detailing the relevant information regarding risky products and 
polluting activities that regulated parties are not required to provide under existing 
regulatory programs).
6risky products.  In his path-breaking work on comparative institutional analysis, Neil 
Komesar observes that participation is based on the benefits and costs of participation.9
When the costs of information are lowered and information becomes more accessible, 
participation increases.  Similarly, when the benefits to participation rise – for example 
through damage awards in tort claims – participation by at least these beneficiaries of the 
public increases.  It is this combined cost-benefit – higher benefits to participation and 
lower costs – that explains the comparative advantages of the tort system in providing 
improved access to needed information, at least in settings where the regulatory system is 
encountering rising information-related barriers to participation.
A. Information Costs
Individuals participate in regulatory decisions when they can access information 
that allows them to contribute in meaningful ways.  The tort system sometimes fares 
better than the regulatory system at ensuring that this information is available to 
participants. 
1. Asymmetrical Information
When manufacturers conceal information about product risks, they insulate 
themselves from accountability for the harms they might be causing to society.  This 
privately held information can constitute a costly barrier, sometimes an insurmountable
one, to general public participation in decisions about regulating product and related 
industrial risks.  Without key information on the ways in which a product might be risky 
– evidence that tobacco is addictive, that asbestos is carcinogenic, or that a birth control 
9 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW 8 
(1995).
7device breeds lethal bacteria to name a few examples – the public cannot participate 
meaningfully on whether or how to regulate products that cause harms.
While in theory the legislative/executive branch should be able to access a great 
deal of private information, the political nature of the process imposes real and often 
quite stark limits on the nature and extent to which this information is actually accessed 
and made more generally available to the public.  Congress’ and agencies’ vigor in 
accessing manufacturers’ privately held information regarding the risks of products or 
pollutants reflects a compromise developed with extensive involvement of precisely these 
same regulated parties.  
 There are at least three politically-linked restraints on the agencies’ access to 
privately held information in practice.  First, private parties are generally not required to 
volunteer all relevant private information on the risks of their activities or products.10  For 
example, even after a chemical is on the market, regulations requiring manufacturers to 
submit information on “adverse effects” are ambiguous and provide regulated parties 
with ample legal room to legitimately withhold adverse information on product risks.11
10 See supra note 8.
11 See TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (2000) (stating that manufacturers and processors 
must maintain records of “significant adverse reactions to health or the environment . . . 
alleged to have been caused by the substance or mixture . . . [and must immediately 
report] information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such substances or 
mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment”); TSCA 
Section 8(e); Notification of Substantial Risk; Policy Clarification and Reporting 
Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 33129, 33130 (June 3, 2003).  The disclosure requirements 
governing adverse effects from toxic chemicals requires manufacturers only to report 
what they believe to be “substantial risks” arising from their products.  EPA suggests that 
a “substantial risk” occurs when internal research or evidence “reasonably supports the 
conclusion that the chemical substance or mixture can produce cancer, mutation, birth 
defects or toxic effects resulting in death, or serious or prolonged incapacitation.”  40 
C.F.R. § 159.184.  This high, almost causation-like threshold, coupled with the 
ambiguities in determining when research actually meets the threshold, virtually 
8Essentially the regulated industry is “in charge of citing what information it would like to 
disclose and what analyses it would like to do, presenting ample opportunities for 
industry-funded researchers to keep underlying data and discrepancies confidential and to 
make strategic decisions as to whether to submit research studies for regulatory 
consideration.”12 There is also evidence that regulated parties are not in compliance with 
even these loose and ambiguous information product requirements.13 As a result, the 
agency must often affirmatively request the information they believe they need.
Second, despite some generous grants of authority to affirmatively subpoena 
private information and sometimes even require parties to produce new information, the 
agencies tend to use these authorities conservatively.14  The fear of political backlash, the 
agencies’ limited resources, and more invisible political pressures all likely work to 
temper the agencies’ use of these information-production authorities.  The best example 
is the EPA’s reluctance to use its power to force parties to produce added testing 
guarantee that compliance with reporting will be done only when it is convenient 
(financially and legally) for a manufacturer.  Cf., Dorothy J. Clarke, Court Secrecy and 
the Food and Drug Administration: A Regulatory Alternative to Restricting Secrecy 
Orders in Product Liability Litigation involving FDA-Regulated Products, 49 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 109, 131-35 (1994)  
12
 Linda Greer & Rena Steinzor, Bad Science, ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, 
January/February, at 7 (2002).
13 Cf. Agency Watch, EPA’s Voluntary Data, NAT’L L. J., Nov. 4, 1996, at A10
(reporting that only after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted 
substantially reduced penalties for noncompliance with these reporting requirements 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act did companies volunteer 11,000 studies of their 
products -- four times the number of studies submitted in the prior 15 years since passage 
of the statute).
14 See, e.g.,  TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e); FIFRA, § 136(c)(2)(B).  An exception is the 
EPA’s ability to subpoena information under Superfund from potentially responsible 
parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e).  This authority is used relatively extensively by EPA, in part 
because of private parties’ enthusiasm for the authority which provides them with useful 
information in their private cleanup actions and cross-claims.
9information on chemicals, despite its authority to do so.15 Even though there is a severe 
shortage of toxicity data available for most chemicals in commerce,16 EPA uses its
authority to require testing only in limited instances and even then tends to employ it 
through negotiated settlements rather than unilaterally.17
Third, when information is provided to an agency like the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) – either through administrative requirements or through the 
agency’s more aggressive subpoena or inspection authorities – the agency appears often
to capitulate to the regulated parties’ requests to classify a fair amount of the information 
as “trade secret” protected and therefore unavailable to the public. 18   EPA, for example,
generally does not require the regulated party to justify its trade secret claims but accepts 
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (EPA may require testing on chemicals if the data are 
insufficient to assess the chemical and the EPA has reason to suspect that the new 
chemical “may present” a risk or hazard).
16 See, e.g., Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Do We 
Really Know About the Safety of High Production Volume Chemicals?, 22 Chem. Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) 261 (May 1, 1998) (concluding that basic safety information is unavailable 
for roughly half of the chemicals produced in the highest amounts); CMA More 
Optimistic than EDF On Lack of Data for 100 Chemicals, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 
230, at A-4 (Dec. 1, 1997) (reporting that thirty-three out of one hundred of the Chemical 
Manufacturer Association’s chemical samples had insufficient screening data).
17
 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES COULD MAKE THE ACT MORE EFFECTIVE, at 46 (1994) (discussing the lack of 
testing required of existing chemicals by EPA); Holly E. Pettit, Shifting the Experiment to 
the Lab: Does EPA have a Mandatory Duty to Require Chemical Testing for Endocrine 
Disruption Effects under the Toxic Substances Control Act?, 30 ENVTL. L. 413, 426–27 
(2000) (describing EPA’s use of negotiated testing agreements).
18 See, e.g., EPA, Public Information and Confidentiality Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 
60446, 60446-60447 (Nov. 23, 1994) (“The [Environmental Protection] Agency collects 
chemical, process, waste stream, financial, and other data from tens of thousands of 
facilities in many sectors of American business. Companies frequently consider this 
information vital to their competitive position, and claim it as confidential business 
information (CBI)”); GAO, supra note 17 at 5:2 (Sept. 26, 1994) (finding that chemical 
industry does make improper confidentiality claims; HAMPSHIRE RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, 
INC., INFLUENCE OF CBI REQUIREMENTS ON TSCA IMPLEMENTATION 41 (Mar. 1992) 
(documenting the extent of industry over-use of trade secret claims to classify data).
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them at face value.19 As a result, trade secret overclaiming is so extensive that some 
regulated parties have argued that if EPA requires them to justify trade secret claims 
already in existence, it will constitute a violation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
because of the enormous work burden it will create for small manufacturers.20  Thus even 
to the extent that the agency has access to some private information that bears on product 
risks, the public and even other agency and state officials often cannot access the 
information.21
Relative to their agency counterparts, litigants in tort cases are generally both 
more eager and more able to access asymmetric information held by manufacturers and 
industrial polluters.  Streamlined document production and discovery tools available in 
the courts provide litigants with a much broader sweep of privately held information.  
Rather than relying on manufacturers’ self-screened reports of internal information 
indicating “substantial risk” from their chemicals,22 for example, litigants can seek out all
documents and information that has bearing on a product’s health risks.  The documents 
and related discovery (i.e., depositions and interrogatories) will provide a more complete 
19 See id. EPA, Public Information, supra note 18, at 80395 (Dec. 21, 2000) (observing 
that “CBI regulations generally do not require a business to submit a substantiation until 
disclosure becomes an issue”).
20 See, e.g., Letter from Warren E. Stickle, President, Chemical Producers and 
Distributors Association & Bill Balek, President, International Sanitary Supply 
Association, to EPA, available at
http://www.cpda.com/Content/regulatory_affairs/archived/regulatory_affairs_archived_m
aterial.cfm.
21 See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Seeking a Truce in the Environmental Information Wars: 
Replacing Obsolete Secrecy Conflicts with New Forms of Sharing, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10203, 10204, 10204 (2000) (observing that “[b]oth EPA employee access and EPA 
contractor access to formula and process data was sharply curtailed [after the 1976 
Polaroid hearing], and the system’s cumbersome operation provided frequent Federal 
Register notices when documents were shared with EPA contractors.”).
22 See EPA, TSCA Notification, 68 Fed. Reg. 33, 129, 33130 (2003) (defining 
“substantial risk”).
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picture of the manufacturers’ information on product risks than narrowly drafted self-
report requirements.  Even to the extent that regulators enjoy residual authority to 
subpoena a similar range of information, scarce political capital and agency resources
may inhibit the use of these document production authorities in many settings.
The court system is also much more aggressive in penalizing unjustified privilege 
and related claims, like frivolous claims that information is trade secret protected.  In the 
agencies, trade secret protection claims are assumed to be true unless an outside party 
seeks the information under the Freedom of Information Act.23  If the agency reviews the 
claim and discovers that it is wholly without basis, there is no penalty.24  In such a 
system, the incentives for over-claiming trade secret protections are strong, evidenced by 
the large set of information that is classified as confidential business information.25  In 
the courts, by contrast, litigants are required to provide the opposing party with enough 
information to be on notice of the nature of their privilege claims26 and they understand 
that challenged privilege claims can be reviewed by the court.27  Even more important, if 
the court finds that a privilege claim is unjustified, the party may be sanctioned.28  While 
23 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24 See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.201-2.310. See also Christopher J. Lewis, Comment, 
When Is a Trade Secret Not So Secret?: The Deficiencies of 40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart B, 
30 ENVTL. L. 143, 171-72 (2000) (making this same observation regarding the lack of 
disincentives for overbroad CBI claims).
25 See, e.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency, Confidential Business 
Information (CBI) Review, Pesticides: Freedom of Information Act, at
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/foia/cbi.htm (listing environment-related information that 
is commonly claimed as confidential) (last visited June 28, 2003); see also supra notes 
18-25 and accompanying text.
26 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 26(b)(5).
27 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 37(a)(2).
28 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 37(a)(4)(7).
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over-claiming may still occur in the courts, there are substantially greater disincentives 
for this behavior.
Finally, in contrast to their regulator analogs, litigants tend to be unencumbered 
by political considerations in attempting to access critical asymmetrical information.  If 
the litigation is a good investment, a committed attorney who stands to claim a sizable 
monetary prize has high stakes in locating the suppressed, smoking-gun “needle” in the 
haystack of file folders.  Indeed if the history of several major toxic tort cases are any 
guide, a litigant’s case can rise or fall on discovering suppressed, incriminating 
information.29  While some litigants agree to keep damaging private information 
confidential when the defendant offers bonus payments in a settlement, with this 
admittedly important exception in some litigation, litigants appear eager to share 
incriminating information broadly with other parties. 30
2. Process Costs
Process costs present a second type of information-related cost or barrier that can 
impede participation and engagement in regulating product risks.31  To be able to 
participate meaningfully in a process, one needs information not only on the basic 
features of the problem, but the information and related costs associated with navigating 
the rules of the governing institution.  It is important to understand how other participants 
29 See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 185 (N.Y. 1982) (describing 
conduct of manufacturers of DES); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE 
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 118-19 (1985); PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE 
TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP 10-11, 20-22, 23-1, 129 (1996);  
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
123 (1985); see also infra Part II.
30 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
31 See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 9, at 8 (referring to the “formal 
barriers to access associated with institutional rules and procedures”).
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weigh in on those issues and the radius of their influence, the types of alternatives that are 
acceptable, the impediments to reform, and the points in time that participation can take 
place.  These process costs vary according to the institutional setting and can be so high 
as to effectively preclude participation.  Would-be participants simply may not have the 
expertise or resources to master existing rules, power structures, legal constraints, and 
participatory procedures.
Again in contrast to its common law counterpart, the political process appears 
overwhelmed with unduly high process-related costs, some of which may in fact be 
constructed in part to protect agencies and even regulated parties from vigorous oversight 
by outsiders, including the courts and Congress.  Over the last few decades, the growing 
complexity of the regulatory state – especially with regard to health and environmental 
regulation – has become a concern to commentators.32  Juridification, complexity, and 
chaos theory have been summoned to explain the growing incoherence of public health 
regulation, even to those who are full-time experts in the field.33 When a great deal of 
regulatory requirements are mired in technical reports, agency guidances, and agency 
preambles, opportunities for participation become limited to short windows of time on 
32 See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1240-
41 (1995) (collecting a mix of scholarly commentary lamenting unwieldy “mounds” of 
environmental laws that escape understanding); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-
A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS L.J. 403, 403 (1994) 
("Today, eyeing the tangle of statutes, regulations and court decisions [in environmental 
law] ... the question arises: why is there so much of this stuff and why is it so hard?").
33 See, e.g., Orts, supra note 32, at 1239-40 (discussing the problem of juridification); 
Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1992) (providing a theory for why law can become inordinately complex); Donald 
T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913 
(2005) (discussing the role of complexity theory in administrative law).
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narrow legal issues.34  As a result, attentive publics and interest group representatives 
may find themselves unable to participate due to the sheer costs of processing the 
relevant information and identifying a useful entry point into the political process.35
Relative to the courts, the political branch may also be inherently more 
susceptible to needless legal complexity.  Sophisticated rent-seekers and even agency 
officials or Congress may find it beneficial to construct a regulatory program so complex 
that it defies understanding by attentive participants.36  Complex programs alienate 
participants and increase agency or political power.  A sizable body of public choice 
literature theorizes that political officials benefit by making regulatory systems complex 
in order to provide personalized benefits to their constituents.37  By contrast, although 
there are some incentives for legal complexity in the courts, the counter-pressure for clear 
communication makes courts significantly less inclined towards needlessly complex rules 
34
 Mark B. Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 
27 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 533 (2000); see also Nina A. 
Mendelson, “Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking” (draft 2006 
available on SSRN) (arguing that the diffuse public is generally not included as 
participants in agency guidances that set policy and enforceable requirements).
35 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Restoring Polluted Waters with Public Values, 25 
WILLIAM & MARY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 429 (2000). Effective 
participation, particularly at the political or legislative level, also requires participants to 
understand the political landscape, including stakeholder responses to the problem and 
the history and fate of reform efforts in the policy-making process over time (informal 
legal costs).  While particularly savvy or resourceful participants may locate an attorney 
or interest group well-versed in this information, locating these uniquely suited experts 
within the political process can involve high search and oversight costs.  (These costs are 
discussed more fully below at section I.C.).  
36 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 33, at 26 (observing that the beneficiaries of complex 
laws include "groups that are relatively well equipped to cope with complexity and for 
whom complexity can create a competitive advantage").
37 See, e.g., Morris Fiorina & Roger G. Noll, Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators: A 
Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 239 (1978); 
Morris P. Fiorina & Roger G. Noll, Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional 
Design in the Public Sector, 68 AM. ECON. ASS’N PROC. 256 (1978).
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and processes.  Advocates generally benefit by simplifying their cases for juries and 
judges.38  The nature of the litigation process also forces a judge to render a decision; 
judges, or at least life tenured judges, also face incentives to write clear and coherent 
opinions that can serve as a guide for interested parties and future litigants.  
Process costs also impede the ability of more attentive participants to catalyze 
fellow sympathizers since catalyzing participants generally requires low cost, accessible 
messages.39  The higher the costs needed to understand the regulatory issues, the larger 
the challenge to catalyze others to partake in the institutional process.40  Because 
regulatory processes involve maze-like rules with equivalent maze-like problems, 
communicating these problems and strategies may be difficult.  Without concrete harms, 
moreover, it is difficult to spark the diffuse public’s interest.  Indeed, in the past when the 
dormant majority has been successfully catalyzed to demand reform of existing 
regulatory programs, catastrophes or near-catastrophes served as the focal point to 
generate interest.41  Short of an Exxon Valdez spill or a Love Canal, however, these 
adverse consequences seem most likely to present themselves in civil litigation. 
Civil litigation can serve a vital catalytic role in lowering the process costs to 
onlookers-participants to understand the relevant information and evaluate their stakes in 
ways that are not possible in the political process.  First, civil litigation, with its discrete 
38 See, e.g., ROGER HAYDOCK AND JOHN SONSTENG, ADVOCACY – PLANNING TO WIN: 
EFFECTIVE PREPARATION 10-11 (1994) (advocating “understandable language” and 
“simple explanations” as winning strategies).
39 Cf. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 707 (1999).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Comment, James Kimmel, Jr., Disclosing the Environmental Impact of 
Human Activities: How a Federal Pollution Control Program based on Individual 
Decisionmaking and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environmental Goals of 
the 1970s in the 1990s, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 511-12 (1989).
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claims of concrete harms, helps to lower process costs that overwhelm the political 
branches by focusing participants on the underlying health benefits to greater regulation.  
Civil litigation can also spotlight regulatory exceptions and gaps that permit, for example, 
harmful products to remain on the marketplace without adequate regulatory oversight 
despite laws that appear to govern these risks.  Civil litigation can even bypass 
enforcement slippage that undercuts regulatory programs due to limited government 
resources and complex and effectively unenforceable legal rules.42  Courts, in other 
words, have the capability of educating lower stakes participants about complex social 
issues when the political process has become inaccessible to them.43
3. The Costs of Monitoring Agents
The third information cost is the cost the diffuse public incurs in overseeing 
nonprofit agents in a setting where facts are incomplete and the process for making
decisions is nearly impenetrable.  Because of high information costs arising from 
asymmetric and complex information in the regulatory system, the diffuse public grows 
more dependant on interest groups to lead, educate, and lobby for public-serving ends.  
But these same informational impediments make it difficult for the members to hold their 
public interest agents accountable.44
42 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 315-16 (1999).
43 See, e.g., Schuck, Benched, supra note 3, at 40 (conceding this attribute of some 
“impact” litigation).
44 See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan Macey, Information and Transaction Costs as 
the Determinants of Tolerable Growth Levels, 155 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND 
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 617, 623 – 624 (1999) (arguing that “information and 
transaction costs prevent the public from grasping the implications of most of the 
bargains reached among narrow interest groups and ruling political coalitions.”)
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Courts again are often superior in lowering the costs of overseeing agents relative 
to regulatory processes.  Because of their commitment to adequate representation, the 
courts dedicate some, albeit incomplete effort to insisting on a nexus between attorney 
and client through a series of ethical and court-made rules.45  By ruling on the merits of 
arguments and insisting they be supported by some evidence, the courts also serve as 
gatekeepers on the quality of the positions taken by attorney-agents.46  Even the rules 
governing class actions regulate attorneys through a series of imperfect, but nevertheless 
relatively specific requirements.47  Finally, the public record of all filings provides ready 
information for clients and others interested in an attorney’s arguments and positions.  
By contrast, the political process makes no effort to lower the costs of monitoring 
interest groups that purport to speak for a broader constellation of members and passive 
participants.  There are no ethical or legal rules governing representation in the political 
process; instead interest group representatives operate free of constraints, except for 
reputation-related considerations, in determining how to represent and educate members 
on relevant issues.  This lack of oversight is especially problematic because of interest 
groups’ need to generate support for their cause, which may cause them to overstate the 
adverse consequences and formulate positions based at least as much on generating 
membership as educating the diffuse public on key issues of interest to them.48  Also in 
45 See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rules 1.4, 1.7, 3.2.   
46 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-1.
47 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. For an argument that these rules could be improved see 
Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy 
in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1687 (2004).
48
 In fact, on more than one occasion, the information provided by an organization 
revealed a conflict of interest between their own mission (and effort to retain members) 
and their neutrality on the issue of concern.  See, e.g., David E. Seidemann, Insufficient 
Accountability: Case Study of the Recycling Plan of a Public Interest Research Group, 3 
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contrast to the courts, there is no “neutral” arbiter in the political process to verify the 
strength of the evidence and legal arguments or to oversee the credibility of interest group 
positions.  The primary constraint on the plausibility of interest group claims is oversight 
by its members.  But the members of interest groups may be unaware of the positions 
their agent/interest groups are taking in the political process and often have no way, other 
than accompanying them to meetings, to learn about these positions.49  Although these 
problems also plague some class actions, the political process is devoid of any 
mechanisms of oversight or exit for those who are purportedly represented by a lobbyist 
or other self-appointed spokesperson.  
B.  The Benefits to Participation
Since participation is predicted not only by assessing the costs or barriers to 
participation but each participant’s benefits in participating, a comparison of institutional 
capabilities is not complete without considering the benefit side of the participatory 
equation.50  With respect to health and environmental protection, the courts are able to 
transform at least some of the public’s diffuse interest in protective regulation into high 
stakes damages packages.51  In this role, the courts provide a counterforce to a political 
system that gradually overwhelms the interests of the diffuse public through rising 
information costs.  As long as a particular product or related health or environmental 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 221 (1995) (detailing inaccuracy of NYPIRG study on recycling as the 
answer to NYC’s solid waste problem).  A similar allegation was made with respect to 
the NDRC’s handling of the Alar controversy. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Pesticides and 
Kids, 243 SCIENCE 1280, 1280-81 (1989) (discussing NRDC report); Joseph D. Rosen, 
Much Ado About Alar, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Fall 1990, at 85, 87-88 (1990) 
(identifying weaknesses in NRDC’s risk assessment, which include using arguable math, 
arguable food consumption data, and arguable potency factor).
49 See infra Part II.B.
50 See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 9, at 8.
51 Id. at 171-77.
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concern can be repackaged into a tort claim, with exposed and harmed plaintiffs, then at 
least some of these diffuse, low stakes issues can be reprocessed as high stakes issues for 
a subgroup of the dormant majority.  If many individual damage claims can be 
consolidated into a class action, then the stakes for the attorney-agents can be higher still, 
giving them the incentive to dig for secreted information in ways that political actors or 
even public interest groups filing run-of-the-mill enforcement or qui tam sorts of actions 
lack.
In the political arena, the diffuse public generally faces very low benefits to 
participate in environment and health regulatory decisions.52 The asymmetries in 
information regarding the risks of individual products and activities combined with the 
other informational impediments arising from process and agency costs, only further 
alienate them from understanding the underlying issues at stake or mustering the 
resources necessary to participate in them.  Even the public’s nonprofit agents are 
handicapped in transforming unknowns regarding product safety into salient political 
issues regarding “credible risks.”53  Regulated parties, on the other hand, are acutely 
aware of the costs that could flow from divulging their internal information and face 
potentially very high stakes in avoiding legal rules that require them to share this 
information with others.  Industries’ aggressive efforts to lobby against legislation 
52 See, e.g., KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 9, at 167-68, 192 (noting 
that in product safety where potential for injuries is small, but harm to individuals is 
serious, "[t]he skewed distribution can lead and, in this context, appears to have led to 
overrepresentation of the position of the potential injurer group" in the political process).
53 See, e.g., Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: 
The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 421, 422 (1999).
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requiring even minimal information disclosures,54 coupled with their efforts to expand 
mechanisms for shielding the information that is disclosed from the public using trade 
secret and related legal privileges,55 reinforces a common sense judgment that avoiding 
the disclosure of potential risks of their activities is an important issue to industry.  As 
long as the stakes of the general public remain diffuse, and the nonprofits are unable to 
overcome rising information costs, regulated parties can effectively “capture” the 
decision-making process by keeping damaging information secret and the applicable 
legal rules complex, or at least complex enough so that less sophisticated parties lack the 
resources to invest in understanding them.   
By contrast, in “regulation through litigation” cases, the lucrative damage awards 
for at least a subset of the diffuse public and their attorney-agents create circumstances 
under which the courts can excel relative to regulatory processes with respect to 
counteracting the problem of inflated information costs.56   In order for this shift in stakes 
to occur, there must at least be sufficient time for victims to be exposed to a risk and 
develop harm.  If these conditions have materialized and there is some research linking 
54 See, e.g., David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,232, 10,234 (2002) (discussing industries’ consistent 
opposition to Proposition 65 (a California law requiring additional toxicity labeling on 
products)); Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right to Know: The 
Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (1996) (discussing strong industry opposition to 
passage of Environmental Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)).
55 For example, industry argues that even more trade-secret protections are needed given 
the “mosaic” effect–the ability of competitors to piece together information about their 
operations from bits of publicly available data. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. at 80396 
(discussing how the regulated community “has made the argument that multiple pieces of 
data which may not qualify individually to be treated as CBI and are made publicly 
available can be pieced together to reveal a trade secret.”); Letter Stickle & Balek, supra
note 20, at 5 (same).
56 See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 9, at Cht. 5 (discussing these 
issues in the context of tort reform).
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the harms to exposure to a defendant, the stage is set for a subgroup of the diffuse public 
to become extremely interested in the safety of a particular product or waste in a way not 
present in the political process.  Perhaps still more significant, it is not only the victims 
but their attorney-agents who enjoy large awards in the courts; indeed in personal injury 
class actions, the attorneys’ stakes are likely higher than the individual claimants because 
of the possibility of aggregated awards. Thus, in contrast to nonprofits who face an uphill 
battle to catalyze the dormant majority around such esoteric problems as unspecified 
product risks, with no fiscal remuneration for their efforts, attorneys handling litigation 
involving injurious products face potentially high payoffs for their efforts, enabling them 
to dedicate far more resources and energy to overcoming information costs, particularly 
those posed by asymmetrical information.  Moreover, some of these cases also involve 
corporate misconduct, such as the suppression of damaging information about a product 
or industrial activity, adding the prospect of lottery-sized punitive damages to the 
attorneys’ already high stakes equation.57
The ability of the courts to transform some diffuse, low stakes issues into high 
stakes issues may not apply for all types litigation, however.  Instead, the transformation 
seems most likely when the litigation promises high compensation awards.  Enforcement 
cases, injunctive awards, or related suits challenging agency regulations do not produce 
high financial returns; as a result, the lawyers can be expected to be less tenacious in 
dislodging privately held information or even pursuing the litigation at all, perhaps in part 
57 See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender 
Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 39-46 (1995) (providing survey of punitive 
damage awards in Dalkon Shield, Copper-7 Intrauterine Device, super-absorbent 
tampons, and silicone and saline breast implants, based in part on the fact that 
manufacturers concealed adverse information or avoided testing product in face of 
mounting evidence of hazard).
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because of a lack of resources rather than the absence of will or interest.58  The precise 
tipping point – in terms of the size and probability of large awards needed to make the 
litigation successful in lowering information costs – is unclear, although in regulation 
through litigation cases, successful litigation generally involved high individual awards 
that were consolidated into class actions.
Although courts can lower information costs due, in part, to the higher stakes and 
tenacity of victims and their attorney-agents, these litigants may not always represent the 
public interest in their cases.  In some class actions, the attorney-agents can have stakes 
that are even higher than their individual clients.  This can lead to behaviors that deviate 
from those that the public or even the client-victims would accept, such as blackmailing 
or extorting defendants with weak class action claims or settling mass claims quickly in 
order to avoid a trial.59  Litigation may also not serve the general public interest if the 
ultimate results of a case are concealed.  For example, if the litigants agree to seal any 
damaging documents that might be divulged as a condition to settlement, then the courts 
can do little to dislodge this stubborn, privately held information.60
58
 Although it is an issue that cannot be taken up here, it seems likely that in measuring 
the “stakes” of participants, financial resources to support strong interest in issues must 
be taken into account.  Single mothers in poverty, for example, certainly have 
exceedingly high “stakes” in their children’s welfare. Yet without time or resources, they 
cannot engage in the political process in the way that less-interested but much more 
wealthy participants (i.e., high wage earners who are opposed to taxation) can.  Thus, 
stakes much include an economic component in order to be realistic about the out-of-
pocket costs of citizen engagement. 
59 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, 
J.).
60 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–30 (2001) (discussing the problem of secrecy agreements in 
mass tort cases and how they may in fact conflict with the protection of public safety); 
Keith Schneider, Court Rejects U.S. Effort to Keep Exxon Valdez Settlement Agreement 
Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at A9.  Although it is less likely, it is also the case that 
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C. Summary
A variety of information-related costs can significantly impair the ability of the 
attentive public to participate meaningfully in the regulation of risky products.  These 
information costs exacerbate the already low benefits that typically accrue to most of the 
diffuse public in participating in regulatory decisions.61  Affected industries, by contrast, 
have high stakes and often set significant resources aside for continuous participation in 
these issues.  These high stakes participants put their adversaries at a significant 
disadvantage, especially if some of the asymmetries and legal complexity can be 
protected and perpetuated by these higher stakeholders.  
The courts are able to penetrate the rising information costs that can fog in the 
regulatory system by transforming low stakes issues regarding general public safety into 
high stakes damages claims, at least for a subset of issues.  Lucrative damage awards give 
victims and their attorneys the needed incentives to dislodge secreted information and 
translate their findings to the public at large, thus lowering all information costs at once.  
As a result, when courts are summoned to engage in these issues, their involvement can 
reduce inflated information costs and lead to broader participation across all institutions.  
The courts generally serve only a preliminary role in resolving environmental or 
public health issues, however.  The critics of regulation through litigation are likely 
correct that the courts fare badly, relative to their political counterparts, in reaching a full 
resolution of these complex social problems and are institutionally poorly suited to this 
if the media fails to cover the litigation, the results will not be publicized in a way that 
can lead to important public pressure on the political processes.  
61 See, e.g., Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 9, at 171-77.
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task. 62  Even if this is so, litigation is essential – at least in some cases of public and 
environmental protection – to make the political process work.  In these settings, the 
deficiencies that afflict the court system are dwarfed by much more serious problems that 
paralyze the regulatory process.   The litigation thus serves a vital role in dropping 
inflated information costs, thus sparking public understanding and debate more broadly in 
the market and political process.
II. UNPOPULAR REGULATORY LITIGATION AND ITS SUCCESS IN REDUCING 
INFORMATION COSTS
The courts’ superior abilities to lower information costs are supported not only by 
theory, but practice.  This section reviews some of the allegedly worst examples of 
regulatory litigation – the litigation over breast implants and the municipal gun litigation 
– and concludes that even this litigation succeeds in lowering one or more of the inflated 
information costs and provides public access to otherwise unavailable information, often 
in permanent ways.  The resulting, more level participatory playing field then serves to 
jumpstart other institutional responses to ensuring the safety of these products.
A. Breast implant litigation
The breast implant litigation is generally regarded as exemplifying all that is 
wrong with “regulation through litigation.”63  Critics argue that the litigation was not only 
an end-run around existing regulatory processes, but that it illustrates the hazards of 
empanelling juries to decide technical issues like causation.  
62 See, e.g., Schuck, Benched, supra note 3, at 40. 
63 See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE 
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); David E. Bernstein, The Breast 
Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, (1999).
25
The breast implant litigation targeted several manufacturers – particularly Dow 
Corning – that manufactured implants made with silicone gel.  Because little was known 
about the effects of silica in the body and there was evidence, at least to Dow Corning, 
that some of the silicone leaked from the implants, women who suffered from various 
connective-tissue disorders after receiving their implants argued that their diseases were 
attributable to the implants.64
Initially, plaintiffs enjoyed jury verdicts based in large part on their arguments 
that implants were to blame for their injuries and that the manufacturers were negligent 
for failing to warn or conduct follow-up testing.  Late in the life cycle of litigation, 
however, new scientific research revealed that the verdicts in favor of plaintiffs were 
likely in error with respect to causation since implants did not appear to cause a 
statistically significant increase in connective tissue and autoimmune diseases.65  This
scientific revelation that the early juries were wrong in finding causation, critics claim, is 
striking evidence that the judicial branch lacks the competence to decide highly technical 
issues that routinely arise in health and environmental litigation. 
These criticisms, however, miss the value of the litigation set amidst the larger 
landscape of institutional failure.  The litigation not only overcame information 
asymmetries that allowed manufacturers to conceal incriminating information regarding 
implant safety, but it provided the sanctions and public pressure to force manufacturers 
and public institutions to conduct research to determine whether implants were causing 
serious harms.  
64 See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 63, at 101-08.  
65 See id.
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1. Cutting through the Asym metrical Information and Process 
Costs that Plagued Regulation
There is no disagreement that the breast implant litigation was uniquely 
successful in divulging important, asymmetric information about the risks of implants
held by implant manufacturers.  Because plaintiffs uncovered “smoking gun” evidence of 
manufacturers’ preliminary knowledge that silicone was leaking into the patients’ bodies, 
the litigation succeeded in establishing risks to the implants that at least warranted further 
scientific research.  Indeed, through the course of this early litigation, industry documents 
were discovered that revealed one of the implant manufacturers, Dow Corning, not only 
knew that implants were gradually leaking (in addition to their potential for rupture), but 
it suppressed internal research on the few animal studies it had conducted on rats.66
Disagreement about the value of the litigation instead focuses on whether early 
jury verdicts based on this smoking gun evidence of possible harm reflect juror 
incompetence or instead rough justice.  In terms of the scientific basic for the early 
verdicts, critics are correct that the verdicts  were likely more the result of outrage at the 
manufacturers’ indifference to health risks than on definitive scientific evidence of 
causation.67 But this does not by itself suggest juror incompetence.  In fact, internal 
documents of manufacturer recognition that the devices were leaking once surgically 
implanted, when paired with the defendant-Dow Corning’s resistance to conduct follow-
66 See, e.g., ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL, supra note 63, at 57-61; see also Human 
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm., Comm. On Gov’t Operations, 
102d Cong., The FDA’s Regulation of Silicone Breast Implants 29-31, 34-37 (Comm. 
Print 1993).  
67 See, e.g., Fredric L. Ellis & Ernest Hornsby, Dow Chemical Hid Truth on Breast 
Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at A24 (letter from attorneys in one breast implant
case citing jury’s unanimous finding that “Dow Chemical committed fraud and exhibited 
a conscious disregard for the health and safety of the women receiving silicone gel breast 
implants.”).
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up testing, apparently outraged the jury sufficiently to cause them to not only award 
damages to the plaintiff, but also a sizable punitive damage award.68 And when more 
comprehensive research was ultimately available years after the litigation had begun that
effectively exonerated the manufacturers as a significant cause of connective tissue and 
autoimmune diseases, plaintiff verdicts dropped and defense verdicts rose. See Figure 1.69
In short, had the manufacturers conducted research into the safety of implants prior to 
marketing and made that information available to juries, jury verdicts would likely have 
been favorable to them.  Instead, the very fact that they took advantage their asymmetric 
access to information and withheld information from patients contributed to juries 
awarding significant judgments against them.
68 See id. at 52. Although the incriminating documents were sealed in an eventual 
settlement of the litigation, they were used in subsequent litigation by the same attorney 
and eventually leaked to the media and the press. See Bernstein, supra note 63, at 473-74.
69
 Figure 1 is copied from Rebecca Dresser, et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond 
Science on Trial, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 705, 744.
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From this life cycle of the litigation, it appears that juries entering early plaintiff 
verdicts were not scientifically illiterate, but instead enjoyed a broader view of the 
regulation of implants as a result of presiding over these high stakes cases.  This more 
comprehensive legal perspective allowed them to cut through process and related 
complexity costs that overwhelm the regulatory system and find a way to place basic 
responsibility back on manufacturers for ensuring the safety of their products before 
marketing. In short, these juries appear to have considered the reason for incomplete 
evidence on causation – the manufacturers’ staunch refusal to conduct the needed 
research – in weighing all of the evidence having a bearing on causation.70  Their more 
70
 It has been argued that these juror embellishments on the evidence and liability rules in 
the breast implant cases actually constitute juror nullification.  Yet, even granting that the 
jurors did nullify the liability rule in these cases – a complicated technical and legal 
argument -- this concern must also be put in comparative institutional context.  If jurors 
rightly perceive that the political process failed them, based both on evidence of the 
Figure 1: Timeline of Breast Implant Science, 
Litigation, and FDA Regulation
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holistic approach to weighing incomplete evidence does not necessarily smack of jury 
illiteracy as much as the development of more sophisticated evidentiary presumptions 
when evidence is incomplete.  To the extent that some of the missing evidence was due to 
defendants’ misconduct, the jurors may have reasoned, then there is a presumption that 
this evidence would be incriminating unless evidence is produced rebutting that 
presumption – much like the evidentiary presumptions governing spoliation of the 
evidence.71  A defense verdict would be both a reward and tacit encouragement for 
manufacturers’ recalcitrance in meeting their testing responsibilities and FDA’s laxity in 
enforcing the laws, then nullifying or “adjusting” common law rules in ways that 
reinforce other statutory requirements might be the most democratically responsive 
reaction among the alternatives. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: 
Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 
HOUS. L. REV. 781, 787 (jury verdicts in toxic torts may reflect “our society’s prevailing 
sense of justice in cases where innocent people have been involuntarily exposed to 
substances that are potentially dangerous to their health” rather than a jury’s 
misunderstanding of the scientific mechanisms underlying causation).  Legal scholars 
have in fact argued for reform of causation rules that would place the scientific burden on 
defendant to disprove causation when preliminary testing is the responsibility of the 
defendant manufacturer or polluter and they have shirked their responsibility. See, e.g., 
Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of 
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).  Indeed, perhaps even tort 
causation rules have been beset by legal complexity of sorts that jurors attempt to correct 
through their nullified verdicts.  In any event, when the political process has failed to 
accomplish its promise of requiring manufacturers of drugs and invasive medical devices 
to engage in safety testing, is it so clear that jurors are acting “unaccountably” or 
“incompetently” by attempting to accomplish sub rosa what the legal system promised it 
would do in existing legislation?  In a comparative institutional sense, critics need to 
provide at least some support for other institutional routes to this same end; namely other 
institutional mechanisms for forcing manufacturers to conduct and publicly disseminate 
high quality research on the safety of their products. 
71 See, e.g., Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484, 491-92 (Alaska 1995) (holding 
that missing medical records that result from negligence or intentional acts of defendant 
and that impair the ability of plaintiff to prove a prima facie case create a rebuttable 
presumption shifting the burden of proof for negligence and cause to defendant); see also
id. at 491 (citing cases creating similar presumptions).
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defendants who stonewall testing requirements on their risky products.72 As Professor 
Dreyfuss observes: “In other words, [in the breast implant litigation] we may be seeing 
something of a new liability rule rather than a mistake of fact-finding.”73
2.  The Information-Generating Consequences of the Litigation
It also appears clear from the life cycle of the breast implant litigation that the 
surge of research on implant safety resulted largely from the pressures created by the 
litigation; without the litigation there may have been little additional research.74 In the 
wake of the early plaintiff verdicts, the manufacturers moved from vigorously resisting 
conducting research on the safety of implants and selectively concealing the research that 
was produced, to investing tens of millions of dollars into implant safety research.  As 
one scientist concludes with regard to the litigation and regulatory aftermath:
72 See, e.g., Fredric L. Ellis & Ernest Hornsby, Dow Chemical Hid Truth on Breast 
Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at A24 (letter from attorneys in one breast implant 
case citing jury’s unanimous finding that “Dow Chemical committee fraud and exhibited 
a conscious disregard for the health and safety of the women receiving silicone gel breast 
implants”).
73
 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Galileo’s Tribute: Using Medical Evidence in Court, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 2055, 2070 (1997).  Social science research on the Bendectin litigation 
reveals a similar sort of juror nullification phenomenon when plaintiff’s evidence is 
weakly suggestive of harm and reveals corporate misconduct in failing to produce safety 
testing in the first place. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The 
Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1993).
74 See, e.g., David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA’s Decision on Breast Implants, 326 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1715 (1992) (observing the likelihood that “[h]ad the FDA 
failed to intervene, the uncontrolled and widespread available of breast implants would 
probably have continued for another 30 years—without producing any meaningful 
clinical data about their safety and effectiveness.  Such a situation is obviously 
unacceptable.”).  Even Angell, a critic of FDA and the litigation, concedes that these 
legal interventions led to much needed scientific research on implants.  See, e.g., Marcia 
Angell, Shattuck Lecture—Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay 
of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1515 
(1996) (“After the [FDA] ban, under Kessler’s prodding, the breast-implant 
manufacturers began to do what they should have done years earlier: they began to fund 
serious studies of the safety of breast implants.”). 
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It is possible that the research being driven by this controversy will result 
in a greater understanding of the immunologic implications of xenobiotics, 
of the importance of nonbiased observations, of the need for ready access 
to valid data sets, and of the opportunity for valid scientific information to 
guide legal decisions.75
Rather than a sign of weakness, it is a testament to the success of the litigation that we 
now have a considerable body of scientific research against which to evaluate early jury 
verdicts.  Indeed, if the results of the later research had instead confirmed what appeared 
possible early in the litigation – namely that implants did lead to a statistically significant 
increase in chronic harms – then some of the critics would be forced, by the underlying 
logic of their criticisms, to concede that the litigation made a positive contribution to 
implant safety.76
The motivational force of the litigation is even more impressive when set against 
the failure of regulators to force manufacturers to conduct this same research.  Although 
existing regulatory structures were in place at the time of the litigation to require or force 
manufacturers to produce information on implant safety, FDA’s regulatory demand that 
these manufacturers test the safety of their implants dragged on for more than a decade 
75
 Ralph R. Cook et al., The Breast Implant Controversy, 37 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM
153 (1994).
76
 For example, Bernstein’s critique of the litigation, supra note 63, turns on the fact that 
the research ultimately exonerated implants.  Bernstein does not attempt to argue that this 
causal conclusion was preordained or that the preliminary evidence of leaking implants 
should have been dismissed as a scientific matter.  Presumably, if the research instead 
had followed the path of the asbestos, DES, ultra-absorbent tampon and Dalkon Shield 
litigation, Bernstein would be forced to concede that the litigation served as a positive 
force in creating incentives for safe products.  
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without consequence.77  Throughout this period of regulatory inaction, there was an 
overwhelming consensus among the scientific community that more research was needed 
to be assured that implants were safe and were not causing a host of problems.  A 
representative of the American Medical Association, for example, concluded that 
“[s]ilicone gel breast implants could have benefited from better regulation, quality control 
in manufacturing, preclinical toxicity testing, product development, clinical trials, clinical 
use, informed consent, and less inappropriate patient demand for augmentation by those 
associated with each of these functions.”78  One of FDA’s own scientific advisory groups 
concluded in 1991 that the manufacturers’ clinical studies were “’so weak that they 
cannot provide a reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of these 
devices.’”79
Over this period of time, nonprofits and others concerned about FDA’s policies 
were hamstrung in forcing the agency to take action, and were resigned to a more 
peripheral role that involved regulatory challenges under the Freedom of Information Act 
77 See Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm., Comm. On Gov’t 
Operations, 102d Cong., The FDA’s Regulation of Silicone Breast Implants 10, 13-37, 49
(Comm. Print 1993).  Bernstein criticizes the FDA for its partial ban of implants when 
there was insufficient evidence to establish they caused harms.  Bernstein misunderstands 
the legal requirements, however, which place the burden on the manufacturer to provide 
“reasonable assurance of the safety . . . of the device.” 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).  FDA 
was required to ensure that the manufacturers provided this demonstration of safety, and 
Bernstein acknowledges that the manufacturers failed in this effort.  Bernstein, supra note 
63, at 470-71.  Contrary to his suggestion, then, the FDA’s ultimate decision to impose a 
partial ban on implants under this provision was neither a “grand display” of addled or 
political logic, but instead a half-hearted effort to enforce requirements that had been 
unenforced for over ten years. Id. at 476. 
78 See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants, 270 JAMA 2602, 2606 (1993).
79
 House Report, supra note 77, at 22 (quoting FDA Task Force memorandum).
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and pressuring Congress to hold oversight hearings to embarrass the agency into action.80
Other than suing the agency for not taking more vigorous action under a mandate that 
granted the agency broad discretion, these advocates had little recourse beyond lobbying 
Congress for additional legislation that reaffirmed what FDA seemed unable to demand –
testing as a prerequisite to implant use and marketing.  
Set against this regulatory inaction, the litigation acted as a catalyst for heightened 
public awareness and accompanying regulatory oversight and accountability.  The FDA 
ultimately instituted a ban on the implants, but this was implemented nearly a decade into 
the litigation and thirty years after implants first went on the market.81  In fact, 
Administrator Kessler reportedly decided to institute the moratorium on implants shortly 
after reading the incriminating documents produced through the breast implant litigation.  
The FDA action then appears likely to be at least as much a reaction to the litigation and 
its products as to the peripheral pressures from within the regulatory system.82
Because the litigation accomplished precisely what the regulatory system was 
supposed to do and failed, it seems mistaken to simply write the courts off as 
inappropriate institutional players in the regulation of implants.  Rightly one can question 
whether mass litigation is the most cost-effective way to force the production of valued 
information on the safety of medical devices.  But the litigation appeared to be necessary 
80 See, e.g., Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990); Is the FDA Protecting 
Patients from the Dangers of Silicone Breast Implants?” Hearing Before the Human 
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. Of the House Comm. On 
Government Operations, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990).
81 Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations 
of the House Comm. On Gov’t Reform and Oversight (Aug. 1, 1995), Statement by David 
A. Kessler, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, at 8 
82 See Bernstein, supra note 63, at 474 (discussing the controverted role of the documents 
in prompting the FDA moratorium on implants).
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to create the needed incentives to conduct research on implant safety.  The inadequacy of 
the political process relative to the courts to force the production of this information in 
fact makes sense when one accounts for the very low stakes of the diffuse public.  When 
the only rallying call is the deficiency of safety information in light of some evidence of 
harm, it is difficult to catalyze others to participate in the political process, especially, as 
in the case of implants, when existing legislation already promises to require the research.  
The damages claim in the class actions shifted the stakes from a diffuse public interest in 
product safety to lucrative, high stakes awards to implant victims and their attorneys. 
The breast implant litigation also underscores how manufacturers who are in a 
superior position to research their products can deplete the catalyzing capabilities of 
public health advocates by enshrouding the riskiness of their products in mystery.  The 
absence of information about product risks can effectively shut down the 
political/regulatory process, at least in terms of providing issues needed to catalyze the 
dormant majority.  By contrast, the roulette of juries deciding causation when faced with 
stark evidence of industry indifference to the health of patients is a motivating force for 
manufacturers to produce information if it holds out at least a chance of exonerating 
them.  While some might argue the litigation goes too far in producing these incentives to 
conduct safety research, the dearth of safety testing on chemicals in general suggests that 
it probably doesn’t go far enough.83 Whatever the case, without an institutional “check” 
on preexisting regulatory commitments to force the production of this information, 
83 STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY TOXIC CHEMICALS 
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (1984); 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC IGNORANCE (1997).
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regulators themselves may be more lax in insisting on the information, especially given 
the vigorous participation of regulated industry in agency decision-making.  
B. Municipal gun litigation
The gun litigation, more than any of the other examples of regulation through 
litigation, is said to test the outer limits of the courts’ competency and legitimacy.84  The 
gun litigation includes a number of disparate suits.  After small pockets of successful 
litigation by victims who were injured by guns that were poorly designed, other litigation 
followed that sought broader social goals of safer gun design and distribution.85  Most 
controversial is the gun litigation brought by municipalities to recover health care costs 
associated with gun crimes.  The plaintiff-municipalities typically sue distributors and 
manufacturers for design and sales that are unsafe, arguing in essence that the industry 
neglected to take simple measures that would make guns both less available and less 
lethal, especially in criminal settings.86  According to critics, not only are these municipal 
plaintiffs using tort claims to accomplish regulatory ends, but they are doing so with 
unaccountable litigants and judges, thus undercutting existing democratic processes.
1. Overcoming Information Asymmetries and the Process Costs 
that Obscure Regulatory Failure
Like breast implants, critics who charge that the gun litigation is socially without 
merit again neglect to factor into their analyses the extraordinary barriers to information 
that can impede broader participation in gun control policymaking.  Although the 
litigation has made less progress than hoped because of the early dismissal of most of the 
84 See, e.g., Peter Schuck, Why Regulating Guns through Litigation Won’t Work, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 225 (Timothy D. Lytton ed. 2005). 
85
 Timothy D. Lytton, An Overview of the Lawsuits against the Gun Industry, in SUING 
THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 84.
86 Id.
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suits, some of this litigation has exposed the gun manufacturers’ and distributors’ 
superior information regarding safe gun design and safe distribution and their 
longstanding reluctance to invest in research or practices that could lead to fewer gun 
accidents and crimes.  At least one smoking gun memo divulged through the litigation, 
for example, reveals Colt’s efforts to delay public release of the “smart gun,” partly in the 
hopes of receiving federal funding and partly in order to stave off law suits.87  Other 
discovery from the litigation reveals how, "’until faced with a serious threat of civil 
liability for past conduct, leaders in the [gun] industry have consistently resisted taking 
constructive voluntary action to prevent firearms from ending up in the illegal gun market 
and have sought to silence others within the industry who have advocated reform.’"88  In 
the lengthy opinion resolving the NAACP’s nuisance suit against gun manufacturers and 
distributors in New York City, Judge Weinstein concluded that "the manufacturers and 
distributors . . . [are peculiarly situated], through the use of handgun traces and other 
sources of information, [to] substantially reduce the number of firearms leaking into the 
illegal secondary market and ultimately in to the hands of criminals in New York."89 His 
136 page district court opinion lists a variety of ways that the manufacturers and 
distributors currently are in a superior position to discourage dealerships from allowing
straw purchases and illegal sales.  More generally the litigation has underscored the 
perverse incentives that gun manufactures and distributors face with regard to gun safety: 
87 See Memorandum from Steven M. Silwa, CEO and President, Colt to Zilkha Captial 
Partners et al., June 28, 1999, "iColt Offering Memorandum Draft", at 27, available at 
http://www.gunlawsuits.org/pdf/docket/041803.pdf.
88 Deposition of Robert Riker, gun executive, in Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 
Smoking Guns: Exposing the Gun Industry’s Complicity in the Illegal Gun Market 18 
(quoting Riker deposition).
89
 NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp.2d 435, 449-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Since manufacturers and dealers generally profit from gun violence because it lead to still 
more gun sales, at least in the short term, most of their market incentives are oriented 
towards making guns more lethal.90
The gun litigation also circumvents the complex process and rules that overwhelm 
the regulatory system by spotlighting the political concessions that gun manufacturers 
and distributors, as well as National Rifle Association (NRA) executives, have extracted 
from the political process.  Other than a few limited requirements governing gun sales 
and distribution, such as background checks, there is effectively no regulation of gun 
manufacturers and only scant regulation and enforcement of gun distributors.91  Guns in 
fact may be one of the few products in the United States whose design is not overseen by 
federal regulators, despite the fact that that firearms are second only to motor vehicles as 
the major cause of product-related deaths in the U.S.92  These legislative exemptions are 
not easily located, however; they are spread through a half a dozen statutes and guarded 
closely by the gun industry and affiliated interest groups.  As a result, the mechanisms for 
reforming the current legislative and regulatory maze of exemptions are opaque to most 
attentive participants.  The recent legislation that attempts to immunize gun 
manufacturers from civil liability only exacerbates the manufacturers’ lack of 
90 See generally TOM DIAZ, MAKING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF GUNS IN AMERICA
(1999).
91 See, e.g., David Hemenway, Editorial: Regulation of Firearms, 339 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 843 (1998).
92 See, e.g., S.P. BAKER, B. O’NEILL, M.J. GINSBURG AND G LI, THE INJURY FACT BOOK
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992).
38
accountability for the safe design of guns and further underscores its strong influence 
within the existing political-regulatory system.93
2. Lowering Agency Costs and Providing Better Public Education 
on Safe Gun Design and Distribution
The gun litigation also counteracts the unaccountability of interest groups to the 
people they purport to represent -- and the high costs associated with monitoring them --
that operate in the political process.  The gun litigation may even suggest that in settings 
when information costs are unusually high, the courts may serve the diffuse public 
(nonlitigants) more effectively than the political process, both because there is little 
adequate public representation going on in the political process and because the litigation 
helps educate the broader public to the basic issues -- such as minimal regulation of the 
design and sale of firearms -- that have become obscured by political wrangling and legal 
complexity.
The possibility that litigation, filed by a subset of more “extreme” (albeit 
government) advocates might be more responsive to stakeholders and the public than the 
political process seems, at first blush, preposterous.  Indeed, this is one of the primary 
criticisms of the litigation; namely that unaccountable litigants and courts are left to 
resolve social issues without input from the broader public through the democratic 
process.94  Yet as detailed below, the political process leaves much to be desired in 
providing these democratic services when information costs are excessive.
93 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), Public Law 109-92, 199 
U.S. Statutes at Large 2095 (2005); Lytton, Afterword: Federal Gun Industry Immunity 
Legislation, in GUN LITIGATION (Mich U. Press forthcoming 2006).
94 See Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Won’t Work, supra note 84, at 236-38, 244-47.
39
The effective failure of the political process arises in large part from the 
combination of deficient empirical information and the historic presence of vigorous 
interest groups at both ends of the debate.  The issue of gun control, perhaps more than 
other public health issues, is unusually devoid of helpful empirical information.  Research 
on firearms violence prevention is so deficient that the National Academy of Science 
committee and a Harvard research center are dedicating substantial resources to 
identifying these research gaps and structuring programs to fill them.95
Social issues that lack reliable information to answer pressing policy questions 
provide interest groups carte blanche to frame social issues to their liking.  To the extent 
these groups are interested in attracting members or media attention, they may prefer to 
portray the problems in the most extreme and catastrophic way.  When there are 
competing public positions on an issue and little credible information to constrain the 
positions, as in the case of gun control, the groups tend to become polarized, emphasizing 
the constellation of facts at the tails of the bell curve of possibilities.  This seems to be 
precisely the way the gun control debate has played out in the political process.  Over the 
past few decades, some gun control groups have advocated complete gun bans as the 
preferred reform and portray gun violence as a disease that needs to be eradicated.96  The 
95 See, e.g., The Harvard Injury Control Research Center, at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/nviss/; DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCE, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2 (Washington: National 
Academy Press 2004) (committee found that “answers to some of the most pressing 
questions cannot be addressed with existing data and research methods, however well-
designed”).
96 See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note53, at 465-66, 474.
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NRA and its affiliates, by contrast, frame any gun control effort as a direct infringement 
on the “right to bear arms.”97
Beyond the absence of credible information against which to evaluate interest 
group positions, there are other impediments that the diffuse public  encounters in 
monitoring their interest-group agents’ performance in the political process.  Interest 
groups engaged in lobbying or other forms of political activity are not required to record 
their positions or communicate them to members.  Meetings, letters, congressional 
briefings, and a large variety of disparate contacts can involve positions that might not 
even be in accord with member preferences.  For example, a survey of 607 gun owners 
by Harvard researchers revealed that most NRA members supported types of gun control, 
like registration and waiting periods, that the NRA leaders actively lobbied against.98
This same survey also revealed that members were not fully aware of the leadership’s 
opposition to all forms of gun control.  For example, 90% of the NRA members said they 
"agree[d] with the positions of the NRA", yet their preferences for gun control diverged 
to a significant extent from the NRA’s on virtually every gun control issue.99  In a study 
of environmental nonprofits, survey research similarly revealed incomplete, and in some 
cases very limited communication of an environmental organization’s policy positions to 
97 See, e.g., Douglas S. Weil and David Hemenway, I Am the NRA: An Analysis of a 
National Random Sample of Gun Owners, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 353, 361 (1993). 
98 Id.
99
 Douglas S. Weil and David Hemenway, Reply to Commentary: A Response to Kleck, 8 
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 377, 378, 382 (1993) (compare Table 1 and 2).  The researchers 
conclude from their survey that "the leadership positions of the NRA do not represent the 
views of either the typical NRA member or nonmember gun owners with respect to 
important gun control policies." Weil and Hemenway, I Am the NRA, supra note 99, at 
363.
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its members, at least for the five major nonprofits in the study.100  In some settings, 
moreover, the limited communications between interest group and members may not be 
wholly accidental.  Incomplete communication, especially when positions are expected to 
be controversial within the membership, assists interest groups in avoiding alienating 
members who provide needed financial support.101
Even more perversely, interest groups often serve as the primary source of 
information to members and even the broader public.  Research on nonprofits reveals that 
access to information and education is one of the primary reasons people join nonprofit 
groups.102  Yet, this educational service provides the interest group with still more 
latitude to take extreme positions when available information is limited, particularly 
when crises are likely to generate greater amounts of member dollars.  Distorted or 
incomplete education of members, especially when that education helps keep members 
from leaving the organization, may be a recurring problem with nonprofit representation 
more generally in information-deficient arenas.103 And this deficiency is again magnified 
100
 In the case of the National Wildlife Federation, for example, Shaiko reports that its 
membership appears completely split on the issue of opposition to nuclear power.  
Despite this fact, “[t]he leadership of NWF does take a position on nuclear power 
(antinuclear), but one would have a hard time finding evidence of the position in the 
leaders’ communications to their members.” RONALD G. SHAIKO, VOICES AND ECHOES 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: PUBLIC INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND
161 (1999). 
101 See, e.g., Seidemann, supra note 48, at 224-25 (“While [environmental groups] may 
serve the public as watchdogs, it should be remembered that they have interests (e.g., 
their financial well-being) which do not coincide with those of the public.”); Mark 
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible 
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 463 (2000) (detailing how nonprofit leaders 
may sue some polluters and not others based on issues that affect the sustainability of the 
organization rather than reflect member preferences).
102 See, e.g., SHAIKO, supra note 100, at 150.
103 See, e.g,. id. at 152, 161, 165, 173.
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in the political process where these agents face few, if any, institutional constraints in 
how they choose to educate and represent their members.104
The cumulative deficiencies in interest group representation in the regulatory
process significantly erode one’s confidence in the democratic supremacy of the 
regulatory process relative to the judiciary in settings when information is badly lacking.  
At least in the case of gun control, these interest group problems appear to be largely to 
blame for political inaction regarding gun control reform, even though a vast majority of 
the public, including a majority of NRA members, support gun control reforms.105  At 
least part of this discrepancy between public preferences and political outcomes can be 
attributed to the high information costs that attend monitoring these agents in the political 
process and the general public’s low stakes in engaging in the issues more directly.  
The representational problems that arise in litigation may ultimately be less 
debilitating as compared with the political branches, at least once one accounts for the 
courts’ and litigants’ corresponding ability to dislodge closely-held information relevant 
to gun design from the manufacturers and distributors.  More importantly, because these 
claimants’ positions are largely transparent and go “on record”, they are much easier for 
the broader public (and media) to understand and react to – forming essentially the 
equivalent of a lightning rod for broader social discussion.  
104
 In the courts, there are at least requirements that all factual allegations be made in 
good faith, sanctions against frivolous arguments, and mandatory ethical rules governing 
client representation.  See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., Stephen P.Teret, et al., Support for New Policies to Regulate Firearms: 
Results of Two National Surveys, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 813 - 814 (1998).
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3. Evidence of the Gun Litigation’s Success in Lowering 
Information Costs
The most instructive feature of the gun litigation from the standpoint of the 
comparative attributes of the courts, however, is its ability to lower all of the information 
costs at once, overcoming participatory barriers that have slowly paralyzed the political 
process and made it unresponsive to the underlying preferences and views of the broader 
public. First, by breaking through some of the manufacturers’ asymmetrical information,
the public and their representatives became more educated about the ways guns could be 
made safer. Privately held industry information disclosed in municipal litigation in 
California, for example, not only led to a settlement between the municipality and gun 
dealers, but was followed by some modest state legislation regulating gun distributors.106
This progress in gun control is offset in part by an NRA-designed backlash to the 
litigation that resulted in state laws that insulate the industry from the litigation.107
Nevertheless, evidence that the litigation might lead to gun regulation in some states 
could be a sign of heightened public awareness of the lack of industry accountability 
stemming from the gun litigation.  
Second and perhaps more surprising, increased information on the manufacturers’ 
and distributors’ historic disinterest in gun safety has led to a number of voluntary 
changes within the industry that may be the result of greater public accountability.  As a 
106 See, e.g., Jim Wasserman, Assembly passes requiring gun design changes, 
CONTRACOSTA TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at 
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/cctimes/news/6697952.htm.
107 See generally Lytton, supra note 85.
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result of the litigation, the gun manufacturers focused more attention on safer designs108
and dealers voluntarily instituted efforts to make distribution less susceptible to criminal 
trafficking as a result of the litigation.109 After the litigation was filed, for example, Colt
discontinued its most dangerous and inexpensive models110 and other manufacturers 
began for the first time to equip their guns with external locks.111  Distributors have also 
begun to focus on ways that dealers can prevent straw purchases to criminals.112
Although it seems counterintuitive that manufacturers and dealers might change their 
behavior in response to the largely unsuccessful litigation, this increased attention to 
safety may simply be a rational reaction to economic realities.  Prior to the litigation, 
manufacturers faced no probability of sanctions for careless distribution or design 
practices.  After the litigation was filed, the manufacturers faced a public that had greater 
access to information regarding their practices and could now hold them accountable in 
the marketplace, political process, and courts.  At least in rational choice terms, the 
change in accountability could lead manufacturers to make some investments in safety if 
they believed they could limit or stave off further lawsuits, regulatory requirements, and 
adverse consumer reactions by doing so. There may be other reinforcing reasons for this 
changed behavior, including the possibility that the industry itself was unaware of the gap 
between its practices and the public interest. Most explanations, though, are tied to the 
108 See, e.g., Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How city Lawsuits Can Help 
Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 67, 127 - 34; Jim Lietzel, 
Comment, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 98.
109 See, e.g., id., 95-96.
110 See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda, Colt to Discontinue Cheaper Handguns, WASHINGTON 
POST, EI, Oct. 12, 1999.
111 See, e.g., Brady Center, Smoking Guns, supra note 88, at 15. 
112
 The National Associations of Firearms Retailers now posts on their home page the 
BATFE’s training video for ways that retailers can prevent straw purchasers.  See
http://www.nafr.org/DontLie/index.html.
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fact that by lowering at least some of the information costs for all participants, the 
litigation caused the industry to engage in internal self-evaluation. Others have observed 
similar voluntary industry changes as a result of regulatory disclosure requirements, 
which can bring about improvements in industry practice through greater internal and 
external accountability.113
C. Summary
These two case studies confirm the importance of taking information-related 
barriers to participation into account in comparing the courts against the regulatory 
process.  When relevant information is asymmetrically held or is deficient in ways that 
allow parties to shirk responsibility, as it was in the manufacture of breast implants, then 
participation will be tilted against those who lack access to the information.  In such 
cases, the institution best able to lower information costs will have a comparative 
advantage over the others.  Process costs and the costs of monitoring interest-group-
agents can also be higher in the political process relative to the courts.  The gun litigation 
reveals how advocates that purport to represent broader constellations of interests in the 
political process can operate with limited accountability and might even manipulate 
issues in ways designed to enroll more members.  The courts’ ability to lower these 
monitoring costs, as well as to provide stronger incentives for dealers and manufacturers 
to become concerned with how they can counter gun violence prevention, deserves credit 
in assessing the merits of common law litigation relative to regulation in protecting 
public health.
113 See, e.g., William M. Sage, Regulating through Information: Disclosure Laws and 
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999); Bradley Karkkainen, 
Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, 
Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89 GEO. L. J. 257 (2001).
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III.  GENERAL LESSONS FOR THE REGULATION OF RISKY PRODUCTS
The analysis here suggests that tort litigation is indispensable in ensuring the 
safety and accountability of product manufacturers and industrial polluters.   While 
regulation may sometimes or even frequently prove adequate to access and act on 
information on health and environmental risks, the case studies and general analysis 
suggest that this will not always be the case.  These findings have significant practical 
import and also suggest refinements to existing theories about comparative institutional 
analysis.
The most immediate and practical lesson is that tort reform and related legislation 
that bars tort litigation against industrial subgroups may eviscerate a vital institutional 
tool for regulating risky products and activities.  Over the last decade, there have been a 
variety of legislative attempts to preclude or reduce incentives for tort litigation, most 
obviously the recent federal law protecting gun manufacturers from some civil 
litigation.114 The analysis in this paper suggests that we risk losing important regulatory 
tools when we foreclose the courts and litigants from participating in these regulatory 
decisions.  If information is stubbornly withheld by product manufacturers or polluters 
and if regulatory powers are invisibly constrained through political compromises, the 
courts may be the only institution able to overcome the various barriers to regulation that 
encumber risky products.  At a minimum, those who seek to bar litigation should 
114 See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also Terry Carter, Piecemeal Tort 
Reform, ABA J., Dec. 2001, at 51 (reporting on tort reform bills that provide immunity to 
specific narrow sets of industries).
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establish that the regulatory system is fully engaged in regulating the risky products or 
activities at issue.
The errors that “regulatory litigation” critics have made also provide a platform 
for learning more general lessons about comparative institutional analysis.  First, the 
critics’ critical mistake in ignoring limits in information underscores the importance of 
considering information costs in comparing relative institutional capabilities.  If a great 
deal of the relevant information regarding product risks remains unavailable to all but a 
few participants – either due to asymmetries or high legal complexity – then an institution 
is needed that will overcome these information barriers. This is especially important since 
the availability of information affects participation, both in terms of understanding the 
issues in need of input and appreciating whether one has stakes in an issue at all.  
A second and perhaps larger lesson for institutional reformists is the need to 
combine institutions in a way that maximizes their respective capabilities to correct or 
compensate for underlying participatory imbalances.  Rather than a horse race that seeks 
out a single institutional winner with respect to resolving a social problem, the best 
institutional response may be a mix of institutions that enter the decision-making process 
at different points in the life cycle of an issue or offer different services to overcome 
different types of participation deficiencies.115  Since the cost of information is not static, 
the cost-lowering qualities of the various institutions may differ over time on a given 
issue.116
115 NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
OF RIGHTS 164 (2001) (observing the limited role for the courts in some settings).
116
 Access/production costs related to information may need to be separated from 
transaction/processing costs in comparing institutional competence, for example.
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Third and finally, in terms of institutional choice, finding an institution able to 
dramatically lower information costs can be an end unto itself.  In a setting where 
information costs have become inflated by asymmetrical information, legal complexity, 
and unrepresentative interest groups, an institution that can enter and reduce these 
information costs can make a significant difference to public participation across all 
institutions. Even the cycling between institutions that has been observed in 
contemporary social regulation117 may begin to take care of itself, or at least reduce its 
purposeless passing between institutions, by gaining traction and resultant progress on an 
issue through enhancing public participation across all institutions.  The case studies lend 
support to the value of conducting comparative institutional analysis that has as its 
endpoint identifying the institution best able to lower information costs, rather than 
simply the institution best able to resolve a problem completely.
The case studies detailed above suggest that for the regulation of potentially 
dangerous products, the courts may be the first and best institution to force information 
costs downward, at least once the regulatory system has become mired in asymmetric 
information and convoluted rules and exceptions.  Excessive information costs, coupled 
with the already low stakes of most diffuse public, can raise an insuperably high barrier 
for meaningful participation by the passive majority in the political/regulatory process.  
After litigation by a subset of this majority, the information costs can be lowered 
significantly, making more meaningful participation possible.  Plunging information 
costs can even cause regulated parties to voluntarily alter their practices in order to stave 
off the liability or regulation that inevitably follows heightened public accountability.
117 See, e.g., KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 115, at 163 (discussing the cycling 
phenomenon).
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The defense of the courts in lowering information costs does not put an end to all 
debates over regulation through litigation, however.  Doctrinal and jurisprudential 
concerns remain with respect to some of these suits, and the extent to which preexisting 
doctrine and traditional institutional roles should constrain institutional choice is a debate 
that involves considerations largely separate from comparative institutional analysis.118 It 
is perhaps this battleground that critics are better prepared and more interested in 
defending.  But in these discussions, critics should acknowledge the comparative 
institutional capability of the courts in lowering information costs in ways that can lead to 
improvements in the functioning of all institutions.
IV.   CONCLUSION
Contrary to scholarly commentary and contemporary tort reform legislation, tort 
litigation does play a vital and indispensable role in ensuring the safety and 
accountability of product manufacturers and industrial polluters.  Information regarding 
the safety of products and polluting activities is a key ingredient to public health and 
environmental regulation.  Yet regulators do not always enjoy comparative advantages in 
accessing this vital information.  Instead the courts sometimes serve as the only 
institution able to penetrate and lower information costs that can obscure and preclude 
important public deliberations about health and environmental risks.  
118
  For example, some of the criticisms of regulatory litigation raise doctrinal concerns, 
such as arguments that individual lawsuits are legally frivolous or in violation of 
constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous 
Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco 
Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143 (2001); Walter Olson, Big Guns, REASON, Oct. 1999, 
at 60. These very different doctrinal concerns are not addressed in this article.  
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The fact that the courts are sometimes best suited to lower information costs 
relative to political institutions does not mean that they are capable of resolving these 
policy problems completely.  The courts’ information cost-lowering capabilities do 
suggest, however, that the courts may be the best, first institution capable of penetrating 
social problems characterized by badly asymmetrical information and a high level of 
complexity.  After the courts lower information costs, other institutions that require more 
accessible, low cost information to operate smoothly will be able to engage in problem-
solving and develop more sophisticated political or market responses.
